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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of accounting standard requiring financial 
statement going concern notes on subsequent bankruptcy as well as the effects on 
subsequent corporate downsizing. We examine that extreme poor performing firms are 
more likely to disclose going concern uncertainties with a restructuring plan 
announcement. But firms with more financial institutional ownership, more managerial 
ownership hesitate to disclose uncertainties about business survival. The average going 
concern note effect on subsequent bankruptcy is statistically and economically 
significant. In particular, there are aggressive downsizing in assets, borrowings and 
labor workforce for survival firms as results of proposed solutions to mitigate disclosed 
adverse conditions and events. Our going concern note effects estimators are in 
comparison with potential outcomes if the going concern note had not been disclosed. 
We provide important evidence that newly adopted management going concern 
disclosure requirement works as a means to enhance downsizing or exit of extreme poor 
performing firms by informing market participants. 
Keywords: going-concern note; accounting standards; downsizing; exit 
JEL classification: M41, M48, G33, G34. 
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1. Introduction 
In US-GAAP, there was no guidance about management’s responsibility to evaluate 
whether there is substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern or to provide related footnote disclosures. However, the FASB published an 
update of the accounting standard ASU 2014-15 (August 2014). The standard update 
came into force in the late 2016. The FASB updating accounting standard is similar to 
international accounting standard IAS 1. It mandates going concern disclosures as part 
of the financial report. After the Norwalk Agreement, we have seen international 
convergence of accounting standards, though there are still differences between IFRS, 
Unites States and other countries (Misawa, 2005; Bar-Hava and Katz, 2016). 
In comparison, the US auditing standards requiring auditors to issue going concern 
opinions have existed for several decades. Accordingly, since the beginning of the 1980s 
studies have mainly focused on auditing standards requiring going concern opinions in 
United States. Earlier studies document that quite a number of bankrupt companies 
did not have a prior going-concern opinion (Altman, 1968, 1982; Menon and Schwartz 
1987; Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler 1989; Mutchler, Hopwood, and McKeown 1997; 
Shumway 2001). The predict accuracy of the going concern opinion has been one of the 
most important agenda in accounting research. 
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After the sensational Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies, Raghunandan and 
Subramanyam (2003) find that a model that uses both financial statement and market 
information is an unambiguously superior predictor of bankruptcy than the going 
concern opinion. However, the going concern opinion has incremental predictive ability 
for bankruptcy beyond both financial statement and market-driven variables. Also, 
auditors appear to underweight stock price information and overweight conventional 
financial ratios and firm size when issuing going concern opinions. Recently, Carson, 
Fargher, Geiger, Lennox, Raghunandan, and Willekens(2013) show that the percentage 
of US public companies received a going concern opinion has risen and that there is a 
high probability that a going concern audit report indeed leads to a survival problem. 
Audit going concern reporting is known as its self-fulfilling prophecy effect. The 
self-fulfilling prophecy effect is the adverse effects of the auditor’s public expression of 
doubt about a client’s ability to remain a going concern itself on the company’s fate. This 
leads auditors to issue fewer going-concern opinions. Regarding this issue, Kida's (1980) 
survey suggests that a going concern opinion might bring a company to financial 
distress. Tucker, Matsumura and Subramanyam (2003) argue that a firm can attempt 
to avoid a going concern opinion for its potential self-fulfilling prophecy effect by 
switching auditors when the auditor conveys the intention to issue a going-concern 
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opinion. In the regulatory context of Belgium, Vanstraelen (2003) examines the 
self-fulfilling prophecy effect.  
On the other hand, given quite a number of bankruptcies without prior warning 
from either the management or the auditors, it is debated that more information is 
needed from management to inform investors and creditors of pressing firm failure. 
Conversely, it is argued that voluntary management MD&A disclosures provide 
sufficient information in predicting a firm's ability to continue as a going concern. 
Mayew, Sethuraman and Venkatachalam (2015) find that both management's opinion 
about going concern reported in the MD&A and the linguistic tone of the MD&A 
together provide significant explanatory power in predicting whether a firm will cease 
as a going concern. Moreover, the predictive ability of MD&A disclosure is incremental 
to financial ratios, market-based variables, and even the auditor's going concern opinion. 
In contrast, only 27% had specific going concern disclosure in their MD&A prior to 
bankruptcy in Canada where accounting standard mandates management going 
concern disclosure (Ontario Securities Commission, 2010). In addition, Uang, Citron, 
Sudarsanam and Taffler (2006) find that the mandatory management going concern 
statements do not provide incrementally information for predicting bankruptcy.  
Therefore, it remains controversial whether mandatory management going concern 
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disclosure is appropriate. In this paper, we investigate the effect of accounting standard 
requiring management going concern notes on subsequent corporate restructurings as 
well as the effects on subsequent bankruptcy filings. In response to a spate of 
bankruptcies without voluntary warning in MD&A disclosure or audit reports 
expressing doubt as a going concern around 2000, Japan enacted a requirement for 
disclosure on concerning going concern uncertainties. Since the March 1st,2003, the top 
management of a listed company has been required to disclose its going concern status. 
Additionally, the top management is required to work out a restructuring plan to 
improve continuing ability in case of going concern uncertainties. The firm receives an 
audit opinion regarding both financial statements and going concern disclosure. The 
auditors are also required to collect sufficient evidence to assess effects and feasibility of 
the restructuring plan if doubt exists about going concern status. 
We examine that extreme poor performing firms are more likely to disclose going 
concern uncertainties with a restructuring plan announcement. Interestingly, firms 
with more financial institutional ownership, with more managerial ownership are less 
likely to disclose uncertainties about business survival. The average going concern note 
effect on subsequent bankruptcy is statistically and economically significant. 
Bankruptcy is only one of the possible outcomes for a firm received a going concern 
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opinion. Downsizing is also a significant feature of management going concern 
disclosure. Importantly, we find that assets, debt and workforce shrink sharply as 
results of proposed restructuring solutions to mitigate disclosed adverse conditions and 
events about going concern uncertainties. This suggests that managers of firms 
disclosing uncertainties about business survival recognize that they themselves must 
downsize sharply; otherwise they have to exit.  
This paper contributes to empirical literature on going concern disclosures as follows. 
First, we provide important evidence on the efficiency of accounting standard requiring 
management’s disclosure regarding going concern uncertainties. More importantly, the 
mandatory management going concern disclosure requirement applied in Japan 
provides a solution with the aim of forcing extreme poor performing  firms to 
restructure or to exit by informing market participants in due time, whereas impaired 
banks and troubled firms have perverse incentives to avoid or to delay bankruptcy. In 
an environment of excess capacity, extreme poor performing  firms ought to downsize 
or exit. Mandatory management going concern disclosure requirement works as a part 
of market mechanisms by informing market participants in selecting firms. Also, we 
find that a firm with more financial institutional ownership, with more management 
ownership is less likely to disclose uncertainties about business survival. This suggests 
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incidence of perverse incentives of financial institutions and top management with more 
stakes. Finally, we explore more appropriate methodologies to deal with the endogeneity 
of going concern notes. Our estimators are robust in an environment with endogeneity 
and omitted variables.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the introduction of going 
concern disclosure in Japan. In Section 3, we describe our econometric methodologies. 
Section 4 describes the data and empirical results. In Section 5, we conclude. 
 
2. Restructuring, Bankruptcy and Going Concern Disclosure in Japan 
It was viewed as a striking aspect of the Japanese main bank system: it provided a 
flexible and more effective private alternative to bankruptcy reorganization, for dealing 
with financial distress and debt restructurings. Till the early the 1990s, bankruptcy 
resolutions were rarely employed for large Japanese firms. Most financially distressed 
large firms in Japan restructured troubled debt privately with main bank intervention, 
rather than through formal bankruptcy. 
Since the late 1990s, bankruptcy filings in Japan substantially increased and this is 
quite similar to the bankruptcy wave in the 1980s US downturn of economy. Most of 
bankruptcy filings of listed industrial firms are clustered in the years 1997–2002, as 
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Appendix indicates. This is consistent with the timing of the 1990s’ recession in Japan. 
Even worse, to avoid, or to delay bankruptcy, impaired banks "evergreened" loans by 
funding distressed firms to enable them to meet interest payments on outstanding loans 
(Peek and Rosengren, 2000). As a result, the banks had healthier looking balance sheets, 
because the banks reported fewer problem loans and make smaller loan loss provisions. 
Eventually, quite a number of troubled firms filed for bankruptcy without any prior 
warnings triggered by bank failures. 
The deteriorating banking system was owing to insufficient disclosures. Misawa 
(2005) pointed out that there would have no delay in disclosures of bad loans if the "net 
realizable value" (fair value) method according to U.S. accounting standard had been 
applied. In the late 1990s, there was a general international mistrust among investors 
in Japanese capital markets and the inclusion of a legend such as; "This is prepared 
based on the Japanese accounting standards, not on international standards" was 
requested by the Big Five accounting firms in the United States (Misawa 2005)1. 
Accordingly, harmonization with international accounting standards including 
mandatory management disclosure and audit reporting about going concern 
                                                   
1 Misawa (2005) also noted that the legends of cautionary statements were required 
only for the English version of financial statements based on the Japanese Securities 
Exchange Law, not in any financial statements of SEC registered Japanese companies 
prepared based on the U.S. Accounting Standards. 
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uncertainties emerged as an important issue for revising accounting and auditing 
standards in 1999. For details, Misawa (2005) analyzed the Japanese government's 
positions and makes comments on the problems and issues indicated in the MOF 
(Ministry of Finance) Memorandum entitled "Adoption of International Accounting 
Standards in Japan". 
The Accounting Standards Board of Japan enacted a requirement for both 
management disclosure and audit opinions about going concern uncertainties since 
March 1st 20032.. After that, the top management of a list company has been required 
to disclose its going concern status. And the auditors assess the top management’s 
disclosure on going concern uncertainties. In 2002, the JICPA (Japanese Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants) Audit Standard Committee Report 74 provides detailed 
guidance regarding adverse conditions and events that may raise substantial doubt 
about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Management should disclose 
going concern uncertainties in financial statement notes with proposed solutions if 
adverse conditions and events exist and continue. Besides going concern note, related 
information is also required to be adequately disclosed in the parts of “risks of business, 
                                                   
2 Without any audit standards on going concern uncertainties, auditors had to issue 
special notes to express doubt about a client’s business continuance ability. Till 1999, 
the Japan Corporate Accounting Principles placed importance on the profit and loss 
calculation for a particular period, assuming that the particular period and the 
particular corporation was of on-going concern, as augured in Misawa (2005). 
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etc.” and “analysis of financial position, operating results, and cash flows" under the 
"business condition" section in the Annual Securities Report if a firm is at the risk of 
adverse conditions and events. This is also mandatory requirement in accordance with 
the Security Exchange Law. 
The Report 74 also provides specific going concern risk indications related to (1) 
financial ratios, (2) financial difficulties, (3) operating activities, (4) others as follows. 
First, the management should consider the risk of the validity of the going concern 
assumption by examining warning signs from the financial statements, such as, 
substantial decline in sales, consecutive operating losses or consecutive negative 
operating cash flow, substantial operating losses, ordinary losses or net losses, 
substantial negative operating cash flow, total liability exceeding assets. Regarding 
financial difficulties, management should assess going concern risk if it is difficult to 
repay operating debt, to meet covenants of loans, to pay off corporate bonds, to raise 
new money, to sell major asset as scheduled, or, to pay dividends. Also, a firm should 
evaluate its ability to continue operations in cases of the termination of transactions or 
withdrawing trade credits by the main suppliers, substantial losses of market share or 
favorite customers, lapses of indispensable patents, losses of core personnel, damages, 
losses, or, disposal of indispensable assets, or, substantial regulatory imposition on 
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business. Significant likelihoods of losses from litigation such as damages, substantial 
deteriorations of brand image are other adverse conditions and events that may cast 
doubt on ability to continue as going concern. The auditor issues an unqualified opinion, 
or a qualified opinion, or an adverse opinion or disclaimer by assessing management’s 
going concern disclosure and proposed solution to mitigate adverse conditions and 
events. 
As mentioned above, impaired banks and troubled firms have perverse incentives to 
avoid or to delay bankruptcy. Since the late 1990s, Japan has been experiencing excess 
capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The lost two decades in Japan 
indicate the conventional banking system has failed to deal effectively with the 
requirement for downsizing and exit, as known zombie lending phenomena in Caballero, 
Hoshi and Kashyap (2008). Also, Jensen (1993) addressed the failure of internal control 
systems in the U.S. 1980s. The aim of Japan mandatory management going concern 
disclosure is to provide important information to market participants regarding 
potential restructuring, reorganization or liquidation. More importantly, extreme poor 
performing firms are required to prove solvency and feasibility of proposed solution to 
mitigate the adverse conditions and events. Informed market participants should make 
careful decisions whether to leave the company to the judgement of the court. It works 
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as a means to force extreme poor performing firms to downsize or to exit. Along the line 
of this, we investigate the effects of management going concern note on downsizing and 
exit. 
 
3. Methodologies and Hypotheses 
Now we turn to our econometric methodologies and hypotheses. Some firms issue 
financial statement notes about going concern uncertainties and the rest do not issue 
going concern notes. We would like to know the likelihoods of exit for firms with 
financial statement going concern notes. However, it is not possible to observe what 
would have happened to firms that disclosed going concern uncertainties if had they not 
disclosed them. Moreover, management going concern uncertainty disclosures are 
endogenously determined. In this paper, we employ methodologies which estimators are 
robust in an environment with endogeneity and omitted variables as follows. 
 
Treatment-effects estimation 
It would be ideal for us to observe the bankruptcy probability when a firm issues a 
going concern financial statement note (which we denote as Pgcn), and the bankruptcy 
probability conditional on no going concern financial statement note (which we denote 
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as Pclean). We could then average the difference between Pgcn and Pclean across all the 
sample firms to obtain a measure of the average impact of going concern notes. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to observe a specific firm having a going concern note and 
having a clean note. Also, it is impossible to observe the firm’s bankruptcy probability 
under both circumstances.  
We employ the treatment-effect estimators to estimate the efficacy of going concern 
notes using observational data. Consider firm 𝑖 which has a clean note so that we 
observe outcome yclean,i. What would ygcn,i be for the same firm if it issues a note on going 
concern uncertainties? We call ygcn,i the potential outcome or counterfactual for that firm 
with a clean report. For firm j with a going concern note, we observe ygcn,j, so yclean,j would 
be the counterfactual outcome. Treatment-effect methods can account for this 
missing-data problem.  
We estimate three parameters. The potential-bankruptcy means (POmeans) are the 
means of ygcn and yclean. The average going concern note effect (ATE) is the mean of the 
difference (ygcn-yclean). Finally, the average conditional effect on bankruptcy of a going 
concern note (ATET) is the mean of the difference (ygcn-yclean) among the firms that 
actually report a going concern note. 
ygcn or yclean is the observed outcome variable, t (1 for a going concern note, 0 for a clean 
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note) is the going concern note variable, x is a vector of covariates that affect 
bankruptcy outcome, and z is a vector of covariates that are related to disclosure on 
going concern uncertainties. The bankruptcy functional forms conditionally on going 
concern disclosures are. 
𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑥′𝛽0 + 𝜖0 > 0
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑥′𝛽0 + 𝜖0 ≤ 0
 
𝑦𝑔𝑐𝑛 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑥′𝛽1 + 𝜖1 > 0
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑥′𝛽1 + 𝜖1 ≤ 0
 
where 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are coefficients to be estimated, 𝜖0 and  𝜖1  are error terms that are 
not related to x or z. This potential-outcome model separates each potential outcome 
into a predictable component, 𝑥′𝛽𝑡, and an unobservable error term,  𝜖𝑡 . We let μ(x, t, 𝛽𝑡) 
denote a conditional-mean bankruptcy probability E(y|x, t)  conditional on covariates x 
and going concern disclosure t. The bankruptcy functional form for μ(x, t, 𝛽𝑡) is Φ(x𝛽𝑡). 
Φ(∙) is the cumulative function of normal distribution. 
The going concern disclosure t depends on both financial statement and market 
information which is related to bankruptcy probabilities as follows  
 
𝑡 = {
1       𝑖𝑓 𝑧′𝛾 + 𝜂 > 0
0       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒       
 
 
where γ is a coefficient vector, and is η an unobservable error term that is not related 
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to either x or z. p(z, t, γ) denotes the conditional probability model for the probability 
that a firm has a going concern note conditional on covariates z. The functional form is 
the normal cumulative distribution function Φ(zγ). 
  The three parameters of interest are  
(1) the potential-bankruptcy mean (POmean) 𝛼0 = 𝐸(𝑦0)  
(2) the average going concern note affect (ATE) τ = 𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0) ; and 
(3) the average going concern note effect conditional on going concern note (ATET) 
δ = 𝐸(𝑦𝑡|𝑡 = 1). 
The potential bankruptcy estimators and the average going concern note effect 
estimators use normalized inverse probability weights. The unnormalized weights for 
firm i and going concern disclosure t are 𝑑𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑡𝑖(𝑡)/𝑝(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑡, ?̂?), and the normalized 
weights are 𝑑?̅?(𝑡) = 𝑁𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑡)/ ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 (𝑡). Here, 𝑁𝑡 is the number of observations in going 
concern disclosure t, and 𝑡𝑖(𝑡) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑡; 𝑡𝑖(𝑡) = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖 (𝑡) ≠ 𝑡.  
The unnormalized conditional inverse probability weights are 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑧𝑖, ?̃?, ?̂?)/𝑝(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑡, ?̂?)  
, and the normalized conditional inverse probability weights are 𝑓?̅? = 𝑁𝑓𝑑𝑖/ ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 . The 
normalized conditional inverse probability weights are used to estimate the average 
going concern note effect conditional on disclosing going concern uncertainties.  
The downsizing functional forms conditionally on going concern disclosures are. 
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𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛 =  𝑥′𝛽0 + 𝜖0 
𝑦𝑔𝑐𝑛 =  𝑥′𝛽1 + 𝜖1 
where 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are coefficients to be estimated, 𝜖0 and  𝜖1  are error terms that are 
not related to x or z. This potential-outcome model separates each potential outcome 
into a predictable component, 𝑥′𝛽𝑡, and an unobservable error term,  𝜖𝑡 . We let μ(x, t, 𝛽𝑡) 
denote a conditional-mean downsizing E(y|x, t)  conditional on covariates x and going 
concern disclosure t.  
We implement inverse probability weighted regression-adjustment (IPWRA) 
estimators for the effects of going concern notes on exit and downsizing as described 
above. The IPWRA estimators are known as “Wooldridge’s double-robust” estimators 
(Wooldridge, 2007, 2010). Our estimators are robust in an environment with 
endogeneity and omitted variables. 
 
Hypotheses: downsizing effects of going concern notes 
According to mandatory management going concern disclosure requirement in Japan, 
the top manage should also work out a restructuring plan to mitigate adverse events 
and conditions that may influence the likelihood of business survival in addition to 
going concern note. This means that the management disclosing going concern problems 
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is also required to find solutions such as downsizing of excess capacities and debt 
restructurings to avoid bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is essentially an institution for forcing 
downsizing excess capacity or exit as a part of market mechanisms that are supposed to 
help market participants in selecting firms. To avoid bankruptcy, the management is 
more likely to undertake actions to restore its financial position. And only firms failing 
to restructure their debt have to exit eventually.  
The downsizing feature regarding going concern opinions and disclosures has not 
been fully explored. So far, extant studies mainly focus on the explanatory power in 
predicting subsequent firm failure of auditing opinions, management opinions or 
management disclosures about going concern. Exceptionally, Nogler (1995) find 
significant linkage of debt restructuring activities of going concern opinion firms to 
subsequent successful long-term resolution defined as subsequent receipt of an 
unqualified opinion. This evidence strongly suggests that viable firms receiving going 
concern opinions would have had filed for bankruptcy if they had not restructured debt. 
In other words, we should take into account the benefits of downsizing efforts in 
measuring accuracy of going concern notes.  
Conventionally, the potential costs of Type I errors and Type II errors are considered. 
If a going concern note firm has restructured debt and regained viability, the 
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management was not necessarily wrong to disclose doubt about its ability to continue as 
going concern. Such subsequent viability is an outcome of successful downsizing and 
debt restructurings rather than a wrong management going concern disclosure. The 
point is that whether management going concern disclosures not only provide early 
warnings but also inform investors by working out solutions for going concern problems. 
In this paper, we examine subsequent corporate restructuring activities as well as 
subsequent viability status of firms following going concern notes. We develop our 
hypotheses as follows. 
If a firm is facing with extreme poor performance such as substantial decline in sales, 
consecutive operating losses or consecutive negative operating cash flow, total liability 
exceeding assets, the management has to disclose going concern issues in accordance 
with the Report 74 as mentioned above. Otherwise, the management would risk civil 
liability and criminal responsibility for inappropriate disclosures according to the 
Security Exchange Law. Our first hypothesis is on the relationship between firm 
performance and going concern disclosures. 
H1: Extreme poor performing firms are more likely to disclose going concern 
uncertainties in financial statement notes. 
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Facing costs of civil liability and criminal responsibility, the management still has 
incentives not to or delay to disclose its ability to continue as going concern. Going 
concern problems also mean that assets in place are of exposure to high risks but low 
return. Therefore, the asset substitution agency problem (Jensen and Meckling,1976) is 
much more severe for firms with going concern uncertainties. The management may 
choose to risk creditors’ interests if managerial ownership level is high. For perverse 
incentives, banks may exercise control over management to delay going concern 
disclosures. Our second hypothesis is on effects of managerial ownership and financial 
institutional ownership on decisions to disclose going concern issues as follows. 
H2: Firms with high managerial ownership and high financial institutional 
ownership are less likely to disclose doubts about going concern. 
 
In the literature of corporate finance3, extreme poor performance implies needs to 
downsize, to restructure debt or to exit. To regain viability, the firm fist needs to 
downsize and restructure debt. Also, it is possible that the firm is forced to exit 
regardless of downsizing efforts. For going concern note firms, it is required for the 
                                                   
3  As mentioned above, extreme poor performing firms are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy. Empirical studies on bankruptcy resolution and private debt restructurings 
all show that downsizing and debt restructurings in distressed firms to regain viability. 
For details, see Gilson (1989, 1990), Gilson et al. (1990), Weiss (1990), Franks and 
Torous(1994) and Xu(1997). 
 
Going Concern Note, Downsizing and Exit 
 
 21  
 
management to work out solutions in order to undertake actions to restore its financial 
positions. Our final hypothesis is on subsequent downsizing and exit of going concern 
note firms. 
H3: Going concern note firms downsize more and exit more subsequently. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To test our hypotheses, we use FINANCIALQUEST database to identify listed and 
OTC non-financial firms with first time going-concern uncertainty disclosure for the 
fiscal years 2002 through 2015. Since we are interested in bankruptcy filings 
subsequent to the going concern disclosure, we obtain our sample of bankrupt firms 
from TSR bankruptcy database in the period from April 2003 through March 2016.  
We use rolling estimations in all our analyses. Each estimation period have a one 
year window and the two subsequent years for downsizing. The first estimation period 
includes firm-years with fiscal years ending on March 31, 2003 and the associated 
subsequent period includes firm years ending on March 31, 2005. Correspondingly, the 
last estimation period includes firm-years ending during the period April 30, 2013 to 
March 31, 2014 with the associated holdout period including firm-years with fiscal 
years ending during April 30, 2015 to March 31, 2016. The subsequent bankruptcy for 
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every firm year is examined over a twelve-month period starting on the date of the 
going concern note. Thus firms’ bankruptcy status is examined up to March 2016. As 
seen in the first row of Table 1A, starting from 55799 all available firm*years, 613 firms 
issued first time going-concern financial statement notes. 138 firms filed for bankruptcy 
and 60 firms (43.4%) went bankrupt without prior going concern financial statement 
notes. 
To examine H1 that going concern note firms are extreme poor performing, we 
select poor performing firms in the same industry as control firms for each firm with the 
first time going concern note. Control firms are defined as industrial peers suffering 
from loss at the same fiscal year, in addition to firms with liability in excess of assets, 
firms with negative surplus. Suffering from loss is a significant sign for downsizing. 
Also, it is a sign for investors to pay attentions to corporate business viability. Firms 
with liability in excess of assets are deeply financially distressed. And firms with 
negative surplus are not allowed to pay dividends. Intuitively, investors pay more 
attentions to such deeply distressed firms regarding bankruptcy risk. However, 
subsequent annual data of firms with first time going concern notes are excluded from 
control firms. This yields 6213 firm years. We examine that bankrupt firms were all 
poor performing. Thus it is less likely to introduce unnecessary selection bias due to 
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ignoring data on healthy firms that eventually go bankrupt (Shumway, 2001).  
The purpose of this paper is to figure out what would have happened to firms 
disclosing going concern uncertainties if had they not disclosed them. In the real world, 
researchers use matching methodologies to impute the missing potential outcome for 
each firm by using an average of the outcomes of similar firms4 that do not disclose 
business viability issues. The sampling schemes are in the spirit of matching 
methodologies. According to recently developed treatment estimation methodologies, 
the going concern note effect is computed by taking the average of the difference 
between the observed and imputed potential outcomes using inverse probability 
weighted regression-adjustment estimators as mentioned above. One of the 
assumptions required to use the IPWRA estimators is the overlap assumption, which 
states that each firm has a positive probability of disclosing going concern uncertainties 
and a positive probability of no going concern disclosures. Including healthy firms with 
a zero probability of disclosing going concern issues would violate the overlap 
assumption. Obviously, healthy firms also do not match going concern note firms 
because they are much different from extreme poor performing firms. 
Out of the 613 firms with first time going concern notes, 37 firms filed for 
                                                   
4 Similarity between firms is based on a weighted function of the firm characteristic 
covariates or estimated going concern note probabilities (propensity scores). 
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bankruptcy within the following year. And 60 firms in the poor performing sample filed 
for bankruptcy within the following year did not disclose going-concern uncertainties in 
the immediately preceding financial statements. The fraction of bankrupt firms without 
going concern notes the immediately preceding financial statements is much higher 
than that reported in earlier research for going concern audit report (e.g., Hopwood, 
McKeown, and Mutchler, 1989, 1994; Raghunandan and Subramanyam, 2003, Carson 
et al., 2013). In a longer horizon, 78 out of 138 bankrupt firms (56.52 %) had a prior 
going concern note. To achieve robust going concern note effect on subsequent 
bankruptcy filings, next we turn to IPWRA estimation models. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents variables used in our IPWRA estimation models. In addition to 
variables used in well-known bankruptcy hazard models mentioned above, we include 
financial institutional ownership and managerial ownership to control for perverse 
incentives of banks and management. After excluding firm years without data 
availability, we have 365 firm years with first time going concern note and 3708 control 
firm years. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables defined in Table 2.  
The two profitability measures indicate more than half of the going concern note 
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sample firms report a loss in two consecutive years (DEF_FP2) and that on average they 
have negative cash flow (ROA) in the prior year. Also, going concern note firms have 
lower sales/assets (TRNVR) than control firms. Regarding ability to pay dividends, 73% 
of going concern sample firms were not able to pay dividends for negative retained 
earnings (DEF_SURP), whereas 37% of control firms do not have enough surplus to pay 
dividends. Mean leverage (LEV, BORROW) indicates a high incidence of debt, 
borrowing on average and 8% of going concern note sample firms had liability exceeding 
assets (EXDEBT). The mean liquidity measures (RCASH) indicates that control firms 
have more cash than going concern note sample firms. Overall, in comparison with the 
control firms, the going concern note firms are extreme poor performing, extreme high 
leveraged and extreme illiquid. In other words, going concern note firms all have some 
problems. The mean firm size, measured in natural logarithms of total assets (LASSET) 
show that control firms are larger than going concern note sample firms. Going concern 
note firms use more bonds (RBOND) than do control firms. 
Regarding market information, mean abnormal twelve month stock return 
(ABROR12M) is -18.5% for our going concern note sample firms, in comparison with 
+3.2% mean of control firm years. Also, going concern note firms have higher 
idiosyncratic risks (SSSE) and These differences mean extreme poor performing stock 
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prices and high exposure to risk of the going concern note firms. Finally, our going 
concern note sample firms have lower managerial ownership (RMNG) and financial 
institutional ownership (RFIN). However, on average going concern note firms have 
higher market to book ratio (TOBINQ) than control firms. As indicated in Table 4, 
T-tests and median tests of differences across firms with going concern notes and control 
firms indicates statistically significant differences in most variables at the one percent 
level. 
Looking at subsequent changes in assets, tangible assets, debt, borrowing and work 
force, Table 3 exhibits that firms with going concern notes restructure their assets, debt, 
borrowings and labor force (ΔASSET, Δ TASSET,ΔDEBT,ΔBORROWINGS,Δ
LABOR) aggressively more than their poor performing industrial peers. As indicated in 
Table 4, T-tests and median tests of differences across firms with going concern notes 
and control firms indicates statistically significant differences in all variables at the one 
percent level. In sum, the going concern note firms downsize more subsequently.  
 
Empirical Results 
To examine whether management going concern disclosure works as a means to 
force extreme poor performing firms to downsize or to exit, now we implement IPWRA 
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estimators for the effects of going concern notes on exit and downsizing. First, Table 5 
indicates that extreme poor performing firms are more likely to disclose going concern 
uncertainties. Market information is significantly related to going concern disclosure. 
This supports our hypothesis H1 that extreme poor performing firms are more likely to 
disclose uncertainties about their ability to continue as a going concern. Consistent with 
hypothesis H2, firms with high financial institutional ownership, with high managerial 
ownership are less likely to disclose going concern uncertainties.  
Potential outcome estimation for going concern notes suggest that subsequent 
bankruptcy filings are relying more on market information than financial ratios. This 
indicates that market participants make informed decisions whether to leave the firm 
to the jurists. This is consistent with hypothesis H3. More importantly, the average 
bankruptcy probability among all sample firms would have been 4.1% (ATE) higher 
with significance at the one percent level if all of them had disclosed going concern 
uncertainties. In comparison with potential mean bankruptcy probability of 0.2% if all 
of them had not disclosed doubt about going concern, the impact of management going 
concern disclosure is also economically significant. This impact is very robust. The 
average bankruptcy probability would have been 5.2% (ATET) lower significantly at the 
one percent level if going concern note firms had not disclosed doubt about going 
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concern. This is in support of our hypothesis H3. 
Prior studies have found that around 80-90 percent of companies receiving a going 
concern opinion do not file for bankruptcy in the subsequent year for USA, UK. 
Australia, Belgium (Carson et al., 2013). We find that only 5 percent of going concern 
note firms file for bankruptcy in the subsequent year. Even taking endogeneity and 
omitted variable issues into account, the effect of going concern note on bankruptcy 
filing in the subsequent year is only 4-5 percent. Thus, the Japan mandatory going 
concern disclosure requirement seems have higher Type I errors. However, as noted in 
Carson et al. (2013), bankruptcy is only one of the possible outcomes for a firm receiving 
a going concern opinion. Similarly, exit is one of the possible consequences for a firm 
disclosing a going concern issues in financial statement note. So far, downsizing efforts 
or debt restructurings around going concern opinions or disclosures have not been fully 
explored. Now we turn to the impacts of going concern disclosure on downsizing.  
Table 6 shows that firms with going concern disclosure restructure assets more 
aggressively than their counterparts. Even suffering of losses, Japanese firms would cut 
only 5-6 percent of tangible assets if they had not disclosed going concern uncertainties. 
By contrast, disclosing doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern forces a 
firm to restructure one quarter of its assets. The treated effect among going concern 
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note sample firms is -33% with significance at the one percent level. IPWRA estimators 
in Table 7 indicate a similar pattern for downsizing tangible assets. Going concern note 
firms cut about one third tangible assets in comparison with potential outcome without 
a going concern note. Similarly, poor performing firms would have cut 25% of tangible 
assets if they had disclosed going concern issues. 
At the same time, Table 8 exhibits that debt would have declined by 25.2% (ATE) if 
all sample firms had disclosed going concern uncertainties. In comparison, all firms 
would only cut 2.3% of debt if they had no financial statement going concern notes. 
Firms disclosing going concern problems would have cut 10.2% of debt even they had 
not disclosed going concern notes. The going concern note effect among firms with going 
concern doubt is stronger as ATET indicates. Similarly, Table 9 indicates that firms with 
going concern note aggressively restructure borrowings in comparison with 
counterfactual restructuring if they had not disclosed doubt on business survival. But it 
is the case for all firms. 
Pomean of cut on labor force is 0.4%, 1% respectively without significance at the ten 
percent level in Table 10. This means that poor performing firms without going concern 
notes tend to maintain employment. Also, extreme poor performing firms would have 
not cut back labor force if they had not disclosed them. This strong suggests that firms 
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still resist to layoff workforce regardless of extreme poor performance, inability to pay 
dividends and deep financial distress. This is consistent with Jensen(1993)’s argument 
that managers tend to buy labor peace even facing with technical innovation and 
worldwide competition. However, the treated effect is -12.9% among all sample firms 
and on average going concern note sample firms cut 20.6% of workforce around 
disclosure, in comparison with counterfactual outcomes. These strongly suggest 
disclosing going concern uncertainties enhances extreme poor performing firms to lay 
off employees aggressively. 
We find that extreme poor performing firms are more likely to disclose going concern 
uncertainties in financial statement notes. The firms with a going concern uncertainty 
note are more likely to subsequently file for bankruptcy in comparison with potential 
outcomes without a going concern note. More importantly, the firms disclosing going 
concern uncertainties restructure assets, debt and workforce much more aggressively 
subsequently. Noteworthy is that viable firms undertake aggressive corporate 
restructurings in order to regain viability. This implies that the management accurately 
recognizes going concern issues as disclosed in financial statement notes and is eager to 
downsize to regain viability. It is not the case that the decision to disclose doubt on going 
concern becomes sensitive, while the management disclosing going concern issues 
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seems to undertake no actions to mitigate adverse conditions. Rather, we examine 
aggressive downsizing and debt restructurings around disclosures to regain viability. 
Overall, our results suggest that the mandatory management going concern disclosure 
requirement works as a means to force extreme poor performing firms to downsize or to 
exit by informing market participants.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of accounting standard requiring 
management going concern notes on subsequent bankruptcy as well as the effects on 
subsequent corporate restructurings in comparison with potential outcomes when the 
management had not disclosed. We examine that extreme poor performing firms are 
more likely to disclose going concern uncertainties with a restructuring plan. However, 
a firm with more financial institutional ownership, more managerial ownership is less 
likely to disclose uncertainties about business survival. The average going concern note 
effect on subsequent bankruptcy is statistically and economically significant. As results 
of proposed restructuring solutions, assets shrink, borrowings contract and workforce 
declines aggressively around disclosing going concern uncertainties. Nonetheless, the 
proportion of bankrupt firms that disclose going concern issues in the immediately 
preceding year is only 38.19%. 
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Recently, there is convergence to mandatory management going concern disclosures 
as part of the financial report. We provide important evidence on effects of mandatory 
management going concern disclosure, along the line of requirement of downsizing and 
exit in economies with excess capacity. Our evidence strongly suggests that 
management going concern disclosure requirement works as a means to force extreme 
weak firms to downsize or to exit by informing market participants.  
Our research is subject to several caveats. First, we do not control for audit opinions 
though most audit opinions are unqualified in Japan. Second, it is not possible to 
observe downsizing in firms filing for bankruptcy in the subsequent year because 
bankrupt firms often do not make timely filings. Also, we do not control for the 
voluntary linguistic tone of the MD&A. Recent studies find that the linguistic data in 
the MD&A provides significant explanatory power in predicting corporate survivals. 
Our project in this study, however, is not to develop a bankruptcy prediction model. Our 
purpose is to estimate whether the bankruptcy probability and downsizing activities of 
a going concern note firm would have differed if it had not disclosed survival risk. 
Limited to our best knowledges, it is the first to provide important evidence that 
companies disclosing business survival issues engage in aggressive downsizing and debt 
restructurings. Further research can investigate the impact of downsizing and debt 
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restructuring efforts on subsequent viability over a longer horizon. Aggressive 
downsizing and debt restructurings could mitigate adverse conditions and events to 
regain viability and thus to increase conventional Type I errors. Researchers should 
take into account downsizing feature of going concern opinions or disclosures.  
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Table1 Sample, Going Concern Notes and Bankruptcies 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1A  Sample and Incidence of Going-Concern Opinion and Subsequent Bankruptcies
Sample Fail later Fail in a year
N N % N %
All Available Firm Years 55799
Distressed Firm Years 6826 138 2.02% 49 0.72%
Going-concern (1st time) 613 78 12.72% 37 6.04%
Controlled Firm Years 6213 60 0.97% 12 0.19%
Note: "Distressed" includes both Going-concern Firms and Controlled samples.
See text for details of Controlled Firms.
Table 1B  Financailly Distressed and Going-Concern Firms by Year
(firms)
Year Sample Distressed Going-concern (1st time)
All
Fail
later
Fail
in a year
All
Fail
later
Fail
in a year
2002 4307 971 37 12 101 18 6
2003 4266 584 17 4 66 10 4
2004 4221 425 11 3 42 6 3
2005 4185 347 7 1 46 1 0
2006 4162 448 12 1 71 7 1
2007 4111 554 27 17 125 22 14
2008 4079 1049 15 8 77 10 6
2009 3945 703 5 1 22 1 1
2010 3823 445 3 0 18 0 0
2011 3731 291 2 0 8 1 0
2012 3709 224 1 1 4 1 1
2013 3737 228 1 1 13 1 1
2014 3783 284 0 0 12 0 0
2015 3740 273 0 0 8 0 0
55799 6826 138 49 613 78 37
Note: "Distressed" includes both Going-concern Firms and Controlled samples.
See text for details of Controlled Firms. 
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Table 2   Variable Definitions 
 
GCN 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that 
disclose going concern uncertainties in financial  statement 
notes, and zero otherwise 
FAIL1 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm 
fails within a year, and zero otherwise 
ASSET Total asset 
TASSET Tangible asset 
DEBT Debt 
BORROWINGS Borrowings 
LABOR Employment 
TQ1 Tobin’s q ratio 
TRNVR Sales / total asset 
ROA EBITDA / total asset at the end of the previous year 
DEF_FP2 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm 
runs net income loss for 2 terms in row, and zero otherwise 
DEF_SURP 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm 
runs negative retained earnings, and zero otherwise 
EXDEBT 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms whose 
liability exceeds its asset, and zero otherwise 
LEV Debt/total asset 
RBORROW Borrowings / Debt 
LASSET Logarithm of total asset 
RCASH Cash / total asset 
RMNG Share-holding ratio of managers 
RFIN Share-holding ratio of financial institutions 
ABROR12M 
Abnormal return relative to the averages of TSE 1
st
 section 
over the past 12 months 
SSSE 
Idiosyncratic error derived from “event study regression” for 
each event’s abnormal return 
RBOND Bond / debt 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
  
  
Fimrs with GC Notes Controlled Firms
p75 mean p25 sd N p75 mean p25 sd N
GCN 1 1 1 0 365 0 0 0 0 3708
FAIL1 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.23 365 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 3708
ΔASSET -0.09 -0.31 -0.67 0.45 305 0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.26 3416
ΔTASSET -0.05 -0.26 -0.65 0.77 298 0.03 -0.06 -0.17 0.41 3398
ΔDEBT -0.11 -0.39 -0.79 0.50 305 0.10 -0.02 -0.17 0.36 3416
ΔBORROWINGS -0.11 -0.54 -0.93 0.81 265 0.04 -0.15 -0.35 0.61 2948
ΔLABOR -0.04 -0.22 -0.49 0.41 301 0.06 0.00 -0.10 0.25 3402
TQ1 1.27 1.22 0.65 1.77 365 0.99 0.92 0.49 1.12 3708
TRNVR 1.30 1.04 0.57 0.81 365 1.39 1.13 0.70 0.69 3708
ROA 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.11 365 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 3708
DEF_FP2 1 0.53 0 0.50 365 1 0.36 0 0.48 3708
DEF_SURP 1 0.73 0 0.45 365 1 0.37 0 0.48 3708
EXDEBT 0 0.08 0 0.28 365 0 0.00 0 0.02 3708
LEV 0.90 0.74 0.58 0.28 365 0.75 0.57 0.39 0.24 3708
RBORROW 0.72 0.54 0.40 0.25 365 0.60 0.40 0.21 0.25 3708
LASSET 6.2 5.1 3.9 1.8 365 6.6 5.6 4.5 1.7 3708
RCASH 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.9 365 0.5 0.7 0.1 2.4 3708
RMNG 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.12 365 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.12 3708
RFIN 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.11 365 0.24 0.16 0.04 0.14 3708
ABROR12M -2.9 -18.5 -50.0 65.1 365 17.2 3.2 -26.5 58.4 3708
SSSE 5.2 4.2 3.0 1.7 365 3.7 3.0 2.1 1.4 3708
RBOND 0.07 0.06 0 0.12 365 0.03 0.04 0 0.09 3708
note: 
          Controlled firms are:(i) running net income loss
          (ii) belonging to the same 2 digit industry as GC firms in the same year.
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Table 4 Difference Tests between GCN and Controlled Firms] 
 
 
  
Mean Comparison Test Rank-sum Test Median Test
With
GCN
Controlled
Samples
diff.
A B A-B z-value Pearson's χ2
FAIL1 0.054 0.002 0.052 *** 12.3 *** 152.3 ***
ΔASSET -0.312 -0.006 -0.306 *** -16.3 *** 142.4 ***
ΔTASSET -0.257 -0.058 -0.199 *** -9.8 *** 66.2 ***
ΔDEBT -0.392 -0.014 -0.378 *** -15.5 *** 139.6 ***
ΔBORROWINGS -0.547 -0.154 -0.393 *** -9.9 *** 51.3 ***
ΔLABOR -0.217 -0.002 -0.215 *** -13.1 *** 97.0 ***
TQ1 1.236 0.951 0.285 *** 8.1 *** 58.1 ***
TRNVR 1.042 1.133 -0.091 ** -3.8 *** 8.0 ***
ROA -0.029 0.032 -0.061 *** -12.6 *** 81.6 ***
DEF_FP2 0.530 0.354 0.176 *** 6.7 *** 45.0 ***
DEF_SURP 0.727 0.376 0.351 *** 13.1 *** 172.2 ***
EXDEBT 0.089 0.001 0.088 *** 17.7 *** 312.8 ***
LEV 0.739 0.563 0.176 *** 12.2 *** 77.7 ***
RBORROW 0.543 0.402 0.141 *** 10.2 *** 63.1 ***
LASSET 5.093 5.599 -0.506 *** -5.7 *** 26.2 ***
RCASH 0.392 0.723 -0.331 *** -7.8 *** 41.2 ***
RMNG 0.057 0.072 -0.015 ** -6.6 *** 19.0 ***
RFIN 0.092 0.157 -0.065 *** -10.3 *** 58.1 ***
ABROR12M -18.471 4.460 -22.931 *** -11.2 *** 70.2 ***
SSSE 4.217 3.039 1.178 *** 13.1 *** 111.5 ***
RBOND 0.062 0.039 0.023 *** 4.8 *** 22.3 ***
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note:Based on observations used for FAIL1 regression
Between GCN
 & Controlled
Between GCN
 & Controlled
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Table 5 GC note and subsequent bankruptcy 
 
Effects of GC note on FAIL1 (bankrupt in a year)
Treatment effect estimator 
（１） (2)
ATE r1vs0.gcn 0.041
(2.85)***
ATET r1vs0.gcn 0.052
(4.38)***
POmean 0.gcn 0.002 0.002
(2.45)** (2.26)**
OME0 OME1 OME0 OME1
Outcome Model Eq. (non-treated) (treated) (non-treated) (treated)
TQ1 0 0.002 0 -0.002
(0.35) (0.44) (0.53) (0.44)
TRNVR 0 0.024 0 0.001
(0.26) (1.09) (0.14) (0.12)
ROA -0.006 -0.041 0.01 -0.077
(0.67) (0.40) (0.96) (0.69)
DEF_FP2 -0.002 -0.026 -0.004 -0.017
(1.42) (1.71)* (1.77)* (0.73)
DEF_SURP 0.002 -0.044 0.004 -0.042
(1.99)** (1.69)* (1.44) (1.38)
EXDEBT -0.007 0.027 -0.003 0.04
(2.07)** (0.45) (1.58) (0.75)
RBORROW 0.001 0.036 -0.004 -0.028
(0.54) (0.63) (0.73) (0.53)
LASSET 0.001 0.027 0 0.016
(1.48) (2.23)** (0.54) (1.62)
RCASH 0 0.001 0 -0.017
(1.45) (0.07) (0.67) (1.82)*
RMNG -0.005 -0.026 -0.005 -0.115
(1.85)* (0.27) (1.49) (2.06)**
RFIN -0.001 -0.182 0.014 -0.052
(0.10) (2.54)** (0.93) (0.43)
ABROR12M -0.00000 -0.00031 0.00002 -0.00012
(0.20) (2.84)*** (1.09) (1.17)
SSSE 0.001 0.021 0 0.006
(1.15) (2.08)** (0.92) (0.77)
RBOND -0.008 -0.067 -0.005 -0.075
(1.40) (0.42) (0.96) (1.03)
Treatment Model Eq. ROA -3.801
(7.41)***
DEF_FP2 0.209
(3.16)***
DEF_SURP 0.252
(3.46)***
EXDEBT 1.681
(3.84)***
LEV 1.265
(6.27)***
RBORROW 0.568
(3.36)***
RCASH -0.028
(0.88)
LASSET 0.005
(0.17)
RMNG -0.966
(3.22)***
RFIN -2
(5.04)***
ABROR12M -0.004
(3.17)***
SSSE 0.128
(5.45)***
RBOND 0.533
(1.64)
N 4073
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant terms exist for OMEs and TMEs.
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Table 6 GC note and asset restructuring 
   
Effects of GC note on Δln(ASSET) [ t , t+2 ] Effects of GC note on Δln(TASSET) [ t , t+2 ] 
IPWRA Treatment effect estimator 
（１） (2)
ATE r1vs0.gcn -0.259
(11.46)***
ATET r1vs0.gcn -0.331
(10.95)***
POmean 0.gcn -0.005 0.019
(1.05) (0.78)
OME0 OME1 OME0 OME1
Outcome Model Eq. (non-treated) (treated) (non-treated) (treated)
TQ1 0.064 0.097 0.079 0.099
(3.78)*** (11.26)*** (6.85)*** (6.29)***
TRNVR -0.002 0.017 -0.006 0.074
(0.26) (0.74) (0.31) (2.58)***
ROA 0.369 0.934 0.138 0.729
(3.10)*** (3.13)*** (0.60) (3.36)***
DEF_FP2 -0.023 -0.125 -0.031 -0.05
(2.41)** (2.68)*** (1.05) (1.04)
DEF_SURP -0.018 0.004 -0.04 -0.021
(1.43) (0.07) (1.96)* (0.40)
EXDEBT 1.203 0.15 1.154 0.128
(32.04)*** (1.48) (16.75)*** (1.28)
RBORROW -0.112 -0.131 -0.096 -0.099
(4.66)*** (1.26) (1.05) (0.98)
LASSET -0.026 -0.082 -0.042 -0.073
(5.65)*** (3.86)*** (2.69)*** (3.89)***
RCASH -0.001 0.028 0.013 0.002
(0.37) (1.80)* (0.73) (0.08)
RMNG 0.062 0.015 0.033 -0.22
(1.18) (0.09) (0.16) (1.28)
RFIN 0.196 0.911 0.263 0.76
(4.47)*** (7.00)*** (1.91)* (3.70)***
ABROR12M 0.001 0 0.001 0
(4.86)*** (1.75)* (3.05)*** (0.50)
SSSE -0.018 0.002 -0.036 -0.004
(4.00)*** (0.13) (3.23)*** (0.27)
RBOND 0.009 0.334 -0.351 0.209
(0.13) (1.28) (2.29)** (1.09)
Treatment Model Eq. ROA -3.94
(7.11)*** (6.74)***
DEF_FP2 0.244
(3.45)*** (3.49)***
DEF_SURP 0.291
(3.69)*** (3.63)***
EXDEBT 1.799
(3.09)*** (3.07)***
LEV 1.24
(5.60)*** (5.57)***
RBORROW 0.475
(2.59)*** (2.67)***
RCASH -0.045
(1.07)
LASSET -0.02
(0.65)
RMNG -1.01
(3.10)*** (2.93)***
RFIN -1.784
(4.05)*** (4.06)***
ABROR12M -0.004
(2.89)*** (2.87)***
SSSE 0.112
(4.30)*** (4.25)***
RBOND 0.355
(0.98)
N 3718
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant terms exist for OMEs and TMEs.
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Table 7 GC note and tangible asset restructuring 
 
  
Effects of GC note on Δln(TASSET) [ t , t+2 ] Effects of GC note on Δln(DEBT) [ t , t+2 ] 
Treatment effect estimator 
（１） (2)
ATE r1vs0.gcn -0.248
(4.81)***
ATET r1vs0.gcn -0.324
(5.26)***
POmean 0.gcn -0.05 0.063
(6.25)*** (1.51)
OME0 OME1 OME0 OME1
Outcome Model Eq. (non-treated) (treated) (non-treated) (treated)
TQ1 0.041 0.104 -0.002 0.104
(2.03)** (3.96)*** (0.06) (4.03)***
TRNVR 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011
(0.04) (0.16) (0.31) (0.19)
ROA 0.593 2.34 0.277 0.333
(2.42)** (1.88)* (0.50) (0.55)
DEF_FP2 -0.029 0.02 -0.013 -0.079
(1.67)* (0.21) (0.24) (0.95)
DEF_SURP 0.005 -0.225 -0.022 -0.152
(0.27) (2.03)** (0.65) (1.51)
EXDEBT 2.362 0.164 2.407 -0.004
(34.17)*** (0.94) (20.81)*** (0.03)
RBORROW -0.066 0.109 0.215 -0.13
(1.55) (0.48) (1.68)* (0.63)
LASSET -0.025 -0.114 -0.018 -0.081
(3.50)*** (1.80)* (0.83) (2.54)**
RCASH -0.01 -0.07 0.059 -0.117
(1.22) (1.33) (1.38) (2.02)**
RMNG 0.127 -0.096 0.381 -0.187
(1.34) (0.26) (1.18) (0.61)
RFIN 0.029 -0.555 -0.363 0.222
(0.40) (1.84)* (1.41) (0.55)
ABROR12M 0 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(1.36) (5.46)*** (1.74)* (2.31)**
SSSE -0.022 -0.019 -0.04 0.046
(2.98)*** (0.53) (2.25)** (1.40)
RBOND 0.067 0.763 -0.171 0.629
(0.55) (1.83)* (0.46) (1.42)
Treatment Model Eq. ROA -3.861
(6.74)*** (7.11)***
DEF_FP2 0.248
(3.49)*** (3.45)***
DEF_SURP 0.288
(3.63)*** (3.69)***
EXDEBT 1.791
(3.07)*** (3.09)***
LEV 1.257
(5.57)*** (5.60)***
RBORROW 0.498
(2.67)*** (2.59)***
RCASH -0.052
(1.07)
LASSET -0.019
(0.60)
RMNG -0.96
(2.93)*** (3.10)***
RFIN -1.79
(4.06)*** (4.05)***
ABROR12M -0.004
(2.87)*** (2.89)***
SSSE 0.11
(4.25)*** (4.30)***
RBOND 0.353
(0.98)
N 3693
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant terms exist for OMEs and TMEs.
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Table 8 GC note and debt restructuring 
 
Effects of GC note on Δln(DEBT) [ t , t+2 ] Effects of GC note on Δln(BORROWINGS) [ t , t+2 ] 
Treatment effect estimator 
（１） (2)
ATE r1vs0.gcn -0.252
(7.11)***
ATET r1vs0.gcn -0.288
(9.14)***
POmean 0.gcn -0.023 -0.102
(3.61)*** (5.56)***
OME0 OME1 OME0 OME1
Outcome Model Eq. (non-treated) (treated) (non-treated) (treated)
TQ1 0.06 0.083 0.058 0.063
(5.21)*** (6.16)*** (5.94)*** (3.10)***
TRNVR -0.02 0.032 -0.013 0.054
(2.24)** (0.87) (0.68) (1.59)
ROA 0.286 0.804 0.293 0.746
(1.91)* (1.33) (1.02) (2.72)***
DEF_FP2 -0.053 -0.09 -0.044 -0.075
(4.17)*** (1.44) (1.38) (1.21)
DEF_SURP -0.05 -0.15 -0.077 -0.101
(3.46)*** (2.03)** (3.70)*** (1.57)
EXDEBT 0.554 -0.095 0.599 -0.088
(13.30)*** (0.89) (7.54)*** (0.93)
RBORROW -0.255 -0.486 -0.218 -0.325
(7.61)*** (3.17)*** (2.12)** (2.63)***
LASSET -0.028 -0.108 -0.037 -0.064
(5.11)*** (2.81)*** (2.31)** (2.78)***
RCASH 0.024 -0.104 0.074 -0.013
(3.45)*** (1.87)* (3.35)*** (0.30)
RMNG 0.066 -0.209 -0.064 -0.223
(0.96) (0.79) (0.35) (1.17)
RFIN 0.223 0.862 0.355 0.515
(3.91)*** (3.96)*** (2.42)** (2.01)**
ABROR12M 0.001 0 0.001 0
(3.60)*** (1.75)* (1.87)* (0.32)
SSSE -0.027 0.005 -0.037 -0.004
(4.80)*** (0.26) (3.30)*** (0.26)
RBOND -0.052 0.484 -0.455 -0.055
(0.61) (1.41) (2.59)*** (0.21)
Treatment Model Eq. ROA -3.94
(7.11)*** (5.06)***
DEF_FP2 0.244
(3.45)*** (3.03)***
DEF_SURP 0.291
(3.69)*** (3.44)***
EXDEBT 1.799
(3.09)*** (3.14)***
LEV 1.24
(5.60)*** (4.62)***
RBORROW 0.475
(2.59)*** (3.14)***
RCASH -0.045
(1.07)
LASSET -0.02
(0.65)
RMNG -1.01
(3.10)*** (2.98)***
RFIN -1.784
(4.05)*** (4.01)***
ABROR12M -0.004
(2.89)*** (2.54)**
SSSE 0.112
(4.30)*** (4.12)***
RBOND 0.355
(0.98)
N 3718
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant terms exist for OMEs and TMEs.
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Table 9 GC note and borrowing restructuring 
 
Effects of GC note on Δln(BORROWINGS) [ t , t+2 ] Effects of GC note on Δln(LABOR) [ t , t+2 ] 
Treatment effect estimator 
（１） (2)
ATE r1vs0.gcn 0.02
-0.27
ATET r1vs0.gcn -0.31
(5.74)***
POmean 0.gcn -0.161 -0.233
(14.39)*** (9.40)***
OME0 OME1 OME0 OME1
Outcome Model Eq. (non-treated) (treated) (non-treated) (treated)
TQ1 0.055 -0.004 0.064 0.031
(2.15)** (0.10) (3.61)*** (0.92)
TRNVR -0.056 -0.075 -0.07 -0.081
(2.98)*** (1.24) (2.11)** (1.30)
ROA 0.451 1.802 0.345 0.672
(1.56) (1.68)* (0.89) (0.85)
DEF_FP2 -0.095 -0.149 -0.105 -0.104
(4.02)*** (1.23) (2.27)** (0.99)
DEF_SURP -0.022 -0.236 -0.058 -0.326
(0.83) (1.90)* (1.73)* (3.46)***
EXDEBT 0.805 -0.044 0.742 -0.179
(11.69)*** (0.24) (6.47)*** (1.06)
RBORROW -0.513 -1.704 -0.395 -1.141
(6.33)*** (3.64)*** (2.25)** (3.80)***
LASSET -0.022 -0.06 -0.023 -0.086
(2.22)** (1.80)* (1.17) (2.76)***
RCASH -0.012 0.42 -0.065 0.079
(0.26) (2.27)** (0.91) (0.40)
RMNG 0.305 0.338 0.177 0.356
(2.48)** (0.76) (0.84) (1.03)
RFIN 0.144 0.347 0.053 0.733
(1.28) (1.01) (0.26) (1.87)*
ABROR12M 0 -0.001 0 0
(0.18) (1.97)** (0.41) (0.34)
SSSE -0.034 -0.031 -0.043 -0.018
(3.13)*** (0.81) (2.39)** (0.67)
RBOND -0.003 0.328 -0.58 -0.405
(0.02) (0.64) (1.60) (0.81)
Treatment Model Eq. ROA -3.345
(5.06)*** (7.12)***
DEF_FP2 0.227
(3.03)*** (3.63)***
DEF_SURP 0.293
(3.44)*** (3.78)***
EXDEBT 1.83
(3.14)*** (3.06)***
LEV 1.238
(4.62)*** (5.75)***
RBORROW 0.661
(3.14)*** (2.34)**
RCASH -0.091
(0.72)
LASSET -0.019
(0.58)
RMNG -1.013
(2.98)*** (3.17)***
RFIN -1.833
(4.01)*** (4.04)***
ABROR12M -0.004
(2.54)** (2.85)***
SSSE 0.111
(4.12)*** (4.27)***
RBOND 0.373
(1.02)
N 3214
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant terms exist for OMEs and TMEs.
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Table 10 GC note and layoff of workforce 
 
Effects of GC note on Δln(LABOR) [ t , t+2 ] Effects of GC note on FAIL1 (bankrupt in a year)
Treatment effect estimator 
（１） (2)
ATE r1vs0.gcn -0.129
(4.91)***
ATET r1vs0.gcn -0.206
(7.39)***
POmean 0.gcn -0.004 -0.01
(0.95) (0.65)
OME0 OME1 OME0 OME1
Outcome Model Eq. (non-treated) (treated) (non-treated) (treated)
TQ1 0.033 0.017 -0.003 0.046
(2.21)** (1.03) (0.17) (2.65)***
TRNVR -0.016 0.054 -0.046 -0.002
(2.31)** (2.15)** (2.68)*** (0.06)
ROA 0.377 0.589 0.174 0.442
(2.62)*** (2.17)** (0.70) (2.20)**
DEF_FP2 -0.035 -0.051 -0.081 -0.105
(3.45)*** (0.95) (2.89)*** (2.18)**
DEF_SURP -0.004 -0.092 0.005 0.035
(0.33) (1.71)* (0.22) (0.68)
EXDEBT 0.553 -0.014 0.583 -0.047
(13.37)*** (0.19) (12.12)*** (0.67)
RBORROW -0.046 -0.188 -0.087 -0.125
(1.90)* (1.44) (1.19) (1.28)
LASSET -0.012 -0.044 -0.017 -0.062
(3.00)*** (2.17)** (1.60) (3.90)***
RCASH 0.008 0.002 0.017 -0.03
(1.83)* (0.14) (1.22) (1.44)
RMNG 0.03 0.114 0.321 -0.238
(0.59) (0.47) (1.82)* (1.35)
RFIN 0.005 0.245 -0.209 0.852
(0.12) (1.38) (1.62) (3.72)***
ABROR12M 0 0.002 0.001 0.001
(2.81)*** (14.98)*** (2.47)** (3.14)***
SSSE -0.009 0.01 -0.03 -0.009
(2.06)** (0.53) (3.14)*** (0.71)
RBOND 0.107 1.16 0.02 0.584
(1.63) (3.69)*** (0.12) (2.18)**
Treatment Model Eq. ROA -3.973
(7.12)*** (7.41)***
DEF_FP2 0.258
(3.63)*** (3.16)***
DEF_SURP 0.301
(3.78)*** (3.46)***
EXDEBT 1.78
(3.06)*** (3.84)***
LEV 1.28
(5.75)*** (6.27)***
RBORROW 0.433
(2.34)** (3.36)***
RCASH -0.045
(1.07)
LASSET -0.023
(0.72)
RMNG -1.044
(3.17)*** (3.22)***
RFIN -1.801
(4.04)*** (5.04)***
ABROR12M -0.004
(2.85)*** (3.17)***
SSSE 0.112
(4.27)*** (5.45)***
RBOND 0.216
(0.59)
N 3700
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant terms exist for OMEs and TMEs.
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Appendix 
 
Time series of bankruptcy filings under Corporate Reorganization Law, 
Civil Rehabilitation Law and Liquidation Law of Japan in the years of 1987 - 2002 
Year 
Number of Corporate 
Reorganization filing 
Number of Civil 
Rehabilitation filing 
Number of 
Liquidation filing 
Total 
’87-‘96 10 - 0 10 
‘97 6 - 0 6 
‘98 4 - 3 7 
‘99 2 - 0 2 
‘00 3 7 1 11 
‘01 3 12 1 15 
‘02 8 14 5 27 
Banks, security companies, housing loan companies and insurance companies are excluded 
 
 
